








Abstract:	 This	 theological	 fragment	 is	 concerned	 with	 the	 “humanist”	 (generally	
speaking)	 and	 “feminist”	 (particularly	 speaking)	 implications	 of	 classical	 Christology.	
Based	 on	 the	 exigencies	 of	 Christology,	 it	 proposes	 that	 the	 theological	 renewal	 of	
feminism	 ought	 to	 occur	 by	 integration	 into	 the	 broader	 horizon	 of	 the	 specific	
humanism	proffered	by	 classical	Christology,	 rightly	understood.	 It	makes	a	 first	 step,	
therefore,	towards	framing	the	conditions,	nothing	more,	for	a	rapprochement	between	
a	 “horizontal”	 liberation	 theology	 and	 a	 classical	 “vertical”	 soteriology.	Developing	 a	
constructive	 debate	 between	 the	 perspectives	 on	 Chalcedonian	 Christology	 by	 two	
contemporary	 theologians,	 Sarah	 Coakley	 and	 Aaron	 Riches,	 it	 proposes	 that	 their	
seemingly	 contradictory	Christologies	–	beginning,	 for	 the	 former,	 from	 the	duality	of	
natures,	and	 for	 the	 latter,	 from	 the	unity	 of	person	 –	possess	 similar	 intentions	 (the	
articulation	of	a	 theological	humanism)	but	opposing	 intuitions	about	how	 to	 realize	
such	a	project.	 It	 is	Riches’	 interpretation	 of	 the	human	 in	Christ	 that	must	 form	 the	
appropriate,	Christological	conditions	for	the	realization	of	Coakley’s	aspiration	towards	
an	authentic	religious	feminism.		





relation	 to	 God	 precisely	 through	 his	 “dyothelite”	 (two	 wills)	 approach	 to	 the	
Chalcedonian	 dogma.	 According	 to	 Balthasar,	 Maximus	 was	 therefore	 the	 “real	
predecessor	of	Aquinas”	in	his	particular	concern	to	preserve	the	difference	and	integrity	
of	 creaturely	 freedom,	 as	well	 as	 in	 his	 constructive	 account	 of	 that	 concern,	 which	 he	
purports	 is	 only	 possible	 through	 a	 “higher	 synthesis”	 achieved	within	 the	unity	 of	 God	










and	Aaron	Riches,	 have	 also	 returned	 to	 Chalcedon’s	 Christology	 as	 the	 proper	 starting	
point	 for	 constructive	 theological	 anthropology.	 Further,	 their	 questions	 crystallize	 in	 a	
similar	way	as	their	forebears	around	a	deep	concern	for	the	preservation	of	the	integrity	
of	humanity	in	the	encounter	with	God	and	the	question	of	the	meaning	of	the	incarnation	
for	 human	 spirituality	 and	 freedom.	 A	 look	 at	 the	 surprising	 convergences	 and	
divergences	 within	 their	 proper	 proposals	 will	 elucidate	 the	 specific	 problems	 of	
contemporary	 theology	 and	 create	 an	 opportunity	 for	 a	 renewed	 constructive	
Chalcedonian	“concentration”	for	contemporary	theological	anthropology.	The	debate	we	












In	 an	 important	 article	 published	 in	 2002,	 Sarah	 Coakley	 explores	 three	 divergent	
readings	of	the	Chalcedonian	Christological	Definition	of	451	(“to	be	acknowledged	in	two	




the	 Definition,	 primarily	 negatively—and	 abstractly—defines	 the	 relation	 among	 the	
natures	 in	 the	 hypostasis,	 thereby	 only	 functioning	 as	 the	 “horizon”	 that	 circumscribes	
what	 can	 and	 cannot	 be	 said	 about	 Christ’s	 ontological	make‐up.4	 It	 is	 in	 this	 primarily	
negative	mode	that	she	understands	the	dogmatic	Definition	as	the	seminal	starting	point	
out	of	which	may	flower	theological	development.	She	proposes,	furthermore,	that	in	this	
negative	 Christology	 she	 is	 herself	 closer	 to	 the	 later	 Eastern	 tradition	 of	 faithful	 but	
creative	 thinking	 from	 within	 the	 logic	 of	 the	 Definition.	 Yet	 Coakley’s	 proposal	 is	 not	
purely	apophatic.	The	most	important	option	that	Coakley	critiques	in	her	fine	study,	the	
“linguistically	 regulatory”	 model,	 purported	 most	 eminently	 by	 Richard	 Norris,	 sees	













the	 Definition.5	 For	 Norris,	 the	 Definition,	 if	 seen	 as	 anything	 but	 a	 negative,	 linguistic	
solution	 to	 the	 central	 question	 of	 the	 simultaneity	 of	 divinity	 and	 humanity	 in	 Christ	
(which	it	accomplished	by	distinguishing	between,	but	not	adequately	defining,	physis	and	
hypostasis),	 will	 only	 serve	 to	 “reify”	 the	 two	 terms	 predicated	 of	 Christ	 as	 static	
substances,	 thereby	 degrading	 into	 an	 “onto‐theological”	 (my	 term)	 problematic	 which	




be	 rooted	 in	 an	 overly‐strong	 apophaticism	 that	 a	 priori	 questions	 the	 stability	 and	
veracity	of	any	enduring	kataphatic	element.	Now	if	one	takes	the	influence	of	post‐liberal	
thought	 on	 Norris	 seriously	 (as	 Coakley	 certainly	 does),	 then	 for	 Norris,	 dogmatic	
definitions	 are	 merely	 formal	 grammatical	 rules,	 meant	 to	 guide	 a	 community’s	 self‐
understanding:	 They	 are	 only	 “truth	 claims”	 in	 a	 limited	 sense;	 the	 question	 of	 their	
veracity	 can	only	be	articulated	 from	within	 the	 “orthodox”	 language	game,	by	one	who	
shares	the	same	commitments	and	liturgical	practices.	Coakley’s	problem	with	this	view,	
following	Brian	Daley,	is	that	there	is	no	evidence	that	for	the	pre‐	and	post‐Chalcedonian	









































divorced	 from	 “ontological	 commitments”.6	 Thus	 Norris’	 view	 is	 motored	 by	 an	
“anachronistic	 Lindbeckian	 engine”:	 he	 reads	 back	 into	 Chalcedon	 contemporary	 post‐
metaphysical	 problematics,	 which	 divorce	 language	 from	 reality,	 and	 from	 religious	
experience	 as	 well.7	 Norris	 allows	 his	 (so‐called)	 “post‐liberal”	 cultural‐linguistic	 anti‐
metaphysical	 commitments	 to	 adjudicate	 the	meaning	 of	 Chalcedon	 as	 such.	 As	 for	 the	
second	 and	 third	 views—subtly	 and	 generously	 analyzed	 by	 Coakley,	 viz.,	 first,	 that	 the	
Definition	 is	 merely	 “metaphorical,”	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 or,	 second,	 that	 it	 is	 just	 simply	
“literally	 true”	 and	 defines	 the	 identity	 of	 Christ	without	 ambiguity,	 on	 the	 other—they	
primarily	 suffer	 the	 same	 general	 critique	 as	 Norris:	 they	 eisegetically	make	 assertions	
about	Chalcedon	that	are	alien	to	the	fifth‐century	issues	surrounding	composition	of	the	








First,	 the	Definition	 is	 properly	 understood	 as	 a	 “ruling	 out	 of	 disjunctive	 possibilities.”	
Thus,	in	contrast	to	Hick	and	Norris,	Coakley	suggests	that	“a	new,	and	surprising,	reality	
which	we	could	not	previously	have	 thought	possible	 is	being	gestured	 towards”	by	 the	
Definition.10	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	 literalists,	 Coakley,	 in	 a	 self‐consciously	Kantian	manner,	
suggests:	“[T]he	Chalcedonian	‘definition’—as	Nicaea	and	Constantinople	before	it—takes	

































Christ	 is	 described,	 but	 in	 no	 way	 circumscribed.	 The	 Definition	 is	 neither	 “precise”	
definition,	 nor	 does	 it	 lack	 ontological	 commitments;	 it	 is	 less	metaphorical	 or	 logically	
incoherent,	 than	 it	 is	 a	 “paradox”	 or	 “riddle,”	 an	 invitation	 to	 thought.	 Specifically,	 for	
Coakley,	 it	 defines	 a	 “horizon”	 by	 dismissing	 aberrant	 interpretations,	 it	 offers	 a	 simple	
rule	(the	distinction	between	hypostasis	and	physis)	for	articulating	the	unity	and	duality	
in	Christ,	and,	finally,	most	often	overlooked,	it	recapitulates	in	summary	form	the	salvific	
narrative	 itself.12	There	 are	 therefore	 apophatic	 dimensions	of	 the	Definition,	which	 are	
not	divorced	 from	the	kataphatic:	 It	neither	 “explains	nor	grasps”	 the	reality,	but	 rather	
mysteriously	communicates	it.	 In	short,	 it	 is	a	“regulatory	and	binding	pattern”	meant	to	





of	 the	 constructive	 content	 that	 this	 approach	 to	 Chalcedon	 enables.14	 Here	 Coakley	
analyzes	the	history	of	the	term,	providing	a	learned	summary	of	the	theories	of	biblical,	
patristic,	 early	 protestant,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 twentieth	 century	 British	 kenoticists	 and	
contemporary	 philosophy	 of	 religion.	 Through	 a	 feminist	 analysis	 of	 no	 less	 than	 six	
conflicting	 views	 on	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	 term,	 Coakley	 concludes	 that	 an	 empowering	
“vulnerability”	before	God,	 in	 the	mode	of	contemplative	prayer,	creates	 the	capacity	 for	
reception	 of	 divine	 “non‐coercive	 power”	 to	 become	 manifest:	 “[T]rue	 divine	
‘empowerment’	 occurs	 most	 unimpededly	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 special	 form	 of	 human	
‘vulnerability.’”15	 She	 offers	 this	 version	 of	 kenōsis	 in	 order	 to	 propose	 a	 “vital	 and	
distinctively	 Christian”	 understanding	 of	 kenōsis	 that	 moves	 beyond	 the	 problematic	
pseudo‐feminist	 ideal	 of	 self‐sufficient	 autonomy	 (tied	 as	 it	 is,	 for	 her,	 to	 late‐modern,	
secular,	 perhaps	 even	 atheist‐humanistic	 visions	 of	 the	 good)	 toward	 the	 horizon	 of	 a	
Christological	feminism.		
	
The	 corresponding	Christology,	 then,	 serves	 as	 a	 “corrective”	 to	 secular	 feminism.	
Coakley	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 typical	 rejection	 of	 kenōsis	 by	 contemporary	 feminist	
authors—still,	as	she	says,	“aping	the	 ‘masculinism’	they	criticize”—only	applies	to	more	
or	less	recent	understandings	of	the	term,	which	conceives	kenōsis	as	an	afflictive	release	

















using	 its	 power.	 She	 strongly	 rejects	 the	 alternative	 (Thomasius	 and	 the	 “new	
kenoticists”),	 according	 to	which	 the	divine	Logos	actually	 (and	 freely)	 gives	up	 its	own	
divine	 power	 in	 the	 act	 of	 incarnation.	 This	 second	 view,	 instead	 of	 rearticulating	 the	
meaning	of	divine	power	in	terms	of	liberative	freedom,	instead	“reduces	God’s	‘power’	to	
an	 inherent	 powerlessness.”16	 This	 is	 an	 interesting	 analysis	 but	 the	more	 fundamental	
issue	concerns	whether	the	correlation	between	a	receptive	vulnerability	of	the	creature	
(rooted	 in	 grace)	 to	 an	 empowering	 divine	 and	 a	 Christology	 that	 orients	 itself	 starting	
from	the	difference	of	two	terms	(divine	and	human	“natures”)	does	not	actually	retain	a	




This	 last	 observation	 makes	 better	 sense	 when	 one	 realizes	 that	 Coakley,	 in	
accordance	with	her	concern	for	maintaining	an	empowering	divine,	tends	to	see	that	the	
Alexandrian	 identification	of	 the	hypostasis	 of	 Christ	 solely	with	 the	 transcendent	Logos	
necessarily	 harbors	 a	 “lurking	 ‘docetism,’”	which,	 she	 suggests,	 is	 a	 view	 related	 to	 the	
total	 reversal	 of	 the	 meaning	 of	 kenōsis	 that	 occurred	 between	 Paul	 (who	 was	 not	
concerned	 with	 articulating	 the	 relation	 between	 divinity	 and	 humanity	 in	 the	 kenotic	
hymn)	 in	the	first	century	and	Chalcedonian	thinkers	 in	the	fifth	(for	whom	the	hymn	is	
primarily	 treated	 as	 a	 theological	 metaphysics).	 With	 this	 view	 she	 agrees	 with	 Karl	
Rahner	 analysis	 of	 the	 “current	 crisis”	 in	 Christology.17	 For	 Rahner,	 the	 “almost	
unavoidable	 consequence”	 of	 a	 deficient	 view	 of	 the	meaning	 of	 full	 humanity	 of	 Jesus	






a	one‐sided	emphasis	on	the	hypostatic	union,	 to	 the	denigration	of	 the	 full	humanity	of	
Christ.	 We	 will	 find	 ourselves	 required	 to	 ask	 below	 if	 this	 binary	 view	 that	 sees	 an	
emphasis	on	hypostatic	unity	as	dangerous	for	the	distinction	of	natures,	conceived	in	an	a	




by	 the	 divine	 through	 a	 perichoretic	 saturation	 of	 the	 humanity	 with	 divine	 attributes.	
Divine	 power	 is	 thus	 still,	 according	 to	 Coakley,	 only	 “forceful	 obliteration.”21	 Instead,	














other	 words,	 Coakley	 wants	 to	 read	 Chalcedon	 with	 an	 Antiochene	 stress.22	 Coakley’s	
reading	 of	 Cyrilline	 and	 Alexandrian	 Christology	 is	 arguably	 facile.	 Already	 in	 Cyril	 the	
incarnate	hypostasis	is	understood	in	“complex”	terms	to	be	a	person	at	once	human	and	
divine	 and	 as	 much	 the	 former	 as	 the	 latter.	 This	 hypostatic	 complexity	 lies	 in	 direct	
continuity,	as	our	next	author	will	show,	with	the	Dionysian	account	of	the	theandricity	of	
Christ	 (“theandric	 energies”).	 This	 ought	 to	 mollify	 at	 least	 Coakley’s	 criticism	 that	 the	
Alexandrian	 style	 ignores	or	even	denigrates	 the	 full	 integrity	of	 the	humanity	of	Christ,	
and	 if	 so,	 it	 makes	 the	 ground	 on	 which	 she	 builds	 her	 Christology	 shaky.23	 This	
observation	 leads	 us	 to	 the	 crucial	 question	 which	 we	 will	 have	 to	 ask	 ourselves	
subsequently:	 Is	Coakley’s	 intention	to	preserve	one	aspect	(difference)	at	a	high	cost	 to	


















the	 general	 conception	 of	 the	 relation	 of	 the	 natural	 and	 supernatural	 spheres	 follows	

























same	 should	 be	 said	 of	 Riches	 here.	 It	 should	 be	 noted	 that,	 in	 contrast	 to	 Riches,	 the	
opposite	 movement	 of	 the	 relation	 between	 the	 concrete	 and	 general	 is	 embraced	 by	
Coakley:	 theology	 is	 informed	 first	 by	 particular	 anthropological	 assumptions	
(undergirded	 by	 an	 “extrinsic”	 account	 of	 the	 relation	 between	 God	 and	 creature)	
imported	 into	 Christological	 reflection.	 Their	 primary,	 shared	 anthropological	 concern	
(the	 integrity	 of	 the	 creature)	 nevertheless	 fundamentally	 orients	 their	 thought	 in	
opposite	directions.		
	
Interestingly,	Riches,	 in	agreement	with	Coakley,	 suggests	 that	 if	 the	Chalcedonian	
Definition	 is	understood	“discretely,”	 i.e.,	apart	 from	the	salvific	narrative	and	especially	
apart	from	the	dogmatic	developments	in	Christology	of	the	latter	Councils,	it	is	prone	to	
misinterpretation.	The	difference	is	that	Riches	sees	the	problem	of	such	“discreteness”	in	
a	 certain	 Antiochene	 tendency	 inherent	 in	 the	 Definition	 itself:	 The	 “dyophysitism	 (two	
natures)	of	Chalcedon	actually	risks	a	certain	parallelism	of	the	natures	of	Christ,	 insofar	
as	 it	 leaves	 the	communicatio	 idiomatum	 in	 the	One	Christ	 unspecified.	Thus,	 as	 long	 as	
dogmatic	 Christology	 limits	 itself	 to	 Chalcedon,	 going	 only	 so	 far	 as	 the	 4th	 ecumenical	
council,	 it	 remains	 vulnerable	 to	 a	 misconstrual	 of	 Christology	 (and	 therefore	 catholic	
theology	tout	court)	in	a	quasi‐Nestorian	direction.”26	Constructively,	then,	Riches	argues	
that	the	proper,	Alexandrian	conception	of	unity	is	only	“decisively	articulated”	by	the	6th	
Ecumenical	 Council’s	 (Constantinople	 III,	 680‐1)	 appropriation	 of	 Maximus	 the	
Confessor’s	 dyothelitism.	 This	 Council	 develops	 Chalcedon	 by	 bring	 its	 “paradox”	 into	
fuller	view.	That	 is:	 “it	makes	 concrete	 the	communicatio	 idiomatum	 of	difference	 in	 the	
Son’s	 theandric	 unity.”27	 Hence,	 essential	 to	 Riches’	 theology	 is	 an	 awareness	 of	 the	
“paradoxical”	(in	the	Lubacian	humanist	sense)	quality	of	the	Chalcedonian	definition,	as	





For	 Riches,	 following	 Marie‐Joseph	 le	 Guillou,	 Constantinople	 III	 itself	 can	 only	
properly	be	understood	by	reading	it	through	the	lens	of	the	specific	texts	of	Maximus	(on	
the	 agony	 at	 Gethsemane)	 for	 there	 it	 yields	 a	 “full	 ‘narrativization’”	 of	 the	 ontology	 of	
Christ	 expressed	 in	 the	 Conciliar	 Definitions.29	 Riches	 suggests	 the	 import	 of	 this	
integration	 of	 contextual	 theology	 (Maximus)	 for	 understanding	 the	 Definition:	
“Constantinople	III	affords	a	dogmatic	mode	of	Christology	that	is	at	the	same	time	both	a	
semiotic	 reading	 of	 narrated	 events‐as‐signs	 and	 a	 labour	 of	 speculative	 metaphysics.”	















Undergirding	Riches’	reflections	 is	a	key	sentence	 in	The	 International	Theological	
Commission’s	 (1979)	 summary	 of	 dyotheletic	 dogma:	 “the	 Church	 declares	 that	 our	
salvation	had	been	willed	by	a	divine	person	through	a	human	will.”31	According	to	Riches,	
this	 statement	 expresses	 the	 crucial	 Christological	 ontology	 intended	 by	 the	
Constantinopalitan	dyothelitism,	viz.,	 that	 the	humanity	of	Christ	 is	God’s	own	humanity.	
For	him	any	account	of	the	implications	of	Christology	for	a	“humanism”	(more	broadly)	
or	 a	 “feminism”	 (more	 particularly)	 must	 seek	 to	 think	 from	 within	 this	 paradoxical	
horizon.	For	Riches	this	is	precisely	what	is	given	by	the	Lubacian	paradox	of	grace,	which	
successfully	upholds	the	priority	of	the	divinity—expressed	in	the	unity	of	the	hypostasis,	
and	 simultaneously,	 the	 upraising	 of	 human	 agency	 in	 salvation—expressed	 in	 the	
diversity	of	natures,	which	is,	crucially,	the	direct	result	of	the	unity	for	human	nature.	So,	
in	 other	 words,	 the	 permanent	 distinction	 of	 the	 natures	 in	 the	 Definition	 is	 meant	 to	
express	 none	 other	 than	 the	meaning	 of	 the	 radical	 unity	 for	 humanity:	 the	 fullness	 of	
humanity	is	realized	in	personal	union	with	the	Logos.	Reflecting	on	Maximus,	Riches	says:	
“In	a	Cyrilline	sense,	Jesus—because	he	is	the	incarnate	Logos—is	the	True	Man,	but	he	is	
never	 a	 ‘pure	man’”	Thus,	 “Christ’s	 humanity	 subsists	divinely	 in	 the	Person	of	 the	 Son.	
Therefore	 everything	 Jesus	 is	 and	 everything	 Jesus	 wills,	 both	 ‘is’	 and	 is	 ‘willed’	 in	 the	
unity	of	the	divine	Person.”32	One	must	say	here	that	dyothelitism	is	misunderstood	if	the	
humanity	 of	 Jesus	 is	 figured	 in	 distinction	 from	 its	 enhypostatic	 actualization.	 An	
anhypostatic	human	nature	–	like	the	Thomist	notion	of	“pure	nature”	–	can	only	ever	be	
an	abstraction.	There	is,	in	other	words,	no	conceivable	human	nature	of	Christ	apart	from	
its	union	with	divine	nature	 in	 the	hypostasis	of	 the	Logos.	Again,	 for	 this	Christological‐
humanist	vision,	it	is	the	unity	itself	that	differentiates.		
	
For	 Riches,	 the	 maxim	 of	 dogmatic	 Christology	 is:	 the	 greater,	 more	 intensely	
expressed	 is	 the	 unity	 with	 the	 divine,	 the	 greater,	 more	 intensely	 expressed	 (and	
therefore	 more	 adequately	 understood)	 is	 the	 humanity	 as	 such.	 Thus	 it	 is	 that	 in	
Gethsemane,	in	the	filial	prayer	of	the	Son	to	the	Father,	that	we	first	learn	the	theological	
truth	 that	 “unity	 differentiates”.	 Here	 there	 is	 no	 opposition	 between	 the	 divinity	 and	
humanity	 of	 Jesus,	 but	 rather	 an	 essential	 relation,	 organically	 and	 hierarchically	
understood,	in	which	the	humanity	arrives	to	itself	only	as	it	abandons	itself	in	obedience	
to	 the	 divine.	 Thus,	 for	 this	 vision,	 it	 is	 the	 divinity	 of	 Christ	 that	 is	 the	 essential	
precondition,	 not	 only	 for	 his	 perfect	 unity	 with	 humanity,	 but	 also	 for	 the	 greatest	
realization	of	humanity	as	such.	Otherwise	said,	in	Christ,	humanity	is	a	gift	to	itself;	this	is	





















the	 divine‐humanity	 of	 Christ	 reveals),	 so	 the	 creature	 becomes	 more	 completely	 non‐
divine	 in	the	realization	of	 this	end	(that	 is,	 in	divinization	 itself).	Thus	since	there	 is	no	
greater	 unity	 than	 in	 the	 one	 hypostasis	 of	 the	 Son,	 there	 is	 also	 therefore	 no	 greater	





Like	 Coakley,	 Riches	 finally	 articulates	 his	 ontology	 of	 Christ	 in	 light	 of	 a	 theology	 of	
prayer.	Though	the	general	starting	point	is	the	same,	i.e.,	an	integration	of	spirituality	and	
dogmatic	 theology,	 Riches’	 notion	 of	 prayer	 is	 fundamentally	 different.	 All	 Christian	
prayer,	 for	 him,	 is	 specified	 as	 “filial	 prayer,”	 which	 is	 to	 be	 understood	 in	 light	 of	 the	
Balthasarian	 motif	 of	 the	 missio	 of	 the	 Son.	 This	 missio	 is	 Christ’s	 “communicative	
constitution”	in	which	we	come	to	participate	via	the	grace	of	adoption.	What	we	may	call	
Riches’	 “kneeling	 Christology”	 is	 therefore	 rooted	 in	 a	 fundamental	 sense	 of	 vocation	
determined	by	obedience	to	God’s	fatherly	commission.34	This	concrete‐spiritual	starting	
point	 is	 fitting,	 for	 Riches,	 since	 Maximus’	 dyothelitism	 is	 rooted	 in	 the	 narratives	 of	
Christ’s	 turmoil	 in	 prayer	 in	 Gethsemane	 the	 evening	 of	 his	 arrest.	 Riches	 also	
demonstrates	 the	 richness	 of	 a	 Cyrilline‐Maximian	 stress	 for	 Pneumatology	 and	
Trinitarian	 theology	 more	 generally	 vis‐à‐vis	 this	 narrative.	 He	 finds	 a	 “pneumatology	





at	 once	differentiating	 and	unifying,	 the	 bond	of	 love	 that	 imparts	 radical	 freedom	only	
within	 the	 deepest	 communion	 –	 an	 echo	 of	 Trinitarian	 theology	 at	 the	 heart	 of	
ecclesiology	Christologically	“concentrated.”	Thus	the	Spirit	who	cries	out	within	us	“Abba,	
Father!”	(Rom.	8:15)	is	also	the	very	same	Spirit	of	Christ,	the	complete	expression	of	love	
that	 is	not	 content	within	 itself	 but	overflows,	 opening	 from	within	 toward	 the	other	 in	














insights	 for	his	own	 “phenomenological”	 approach,	which	he	uses	 to	overcome	 the	non‐
reductive	parallelism	that	we	have	seen	to	be	integral	to	Coakley’s	approach	to	Chalcedon.	
Taking	an	undeveloped	reference	by	Coakley	to	Gregory	Nazianzen’s	statement	that	Christ	
himself	 is	 literally	 the	 horizon	 of	 God	 for	 us,	 Riches	 says:37	 “[F]or	 us	 Jesus	 is	 only	
manifested	 in	 the	 existential	 act	 of	 our	 own	 following	 into	 that	 communication	 itself	…	
Only	by	tracing	the	Son’s	personal	communication	do	we	apprehend	who	he	is.”38	We	see	
here	that	Riches	follows	Coakley	in	the	spiritual	reading	of	the	Definition,	but	he	develops	
it	 in	 the	 complete	 opposite	 direction,	 since,	 for	 Coakley,	 the	 horizon	 should	 first	 be	
understood	as	the	articulation	of	a	difference	that	guards	both	the	transcendence	of	God	
and	 the	 self‐determination	 of	 the	 human.	 In	 short,	 Riches	 pushes	 Coakley’s	 spiritual	
reading	of	the	“horizon”	itself	to	the	point	of	a	concrete	encounter	with	Christ.	For	him	the	
Definition	records,	articulates	and	even	mediates	the	salvific	event.	Riches	thus	concludes:	
“In	 this	 way	 the	 Terminus	 of	 Constantinople	 III	 partakes	 of	 the	 horos	 [‘horizon’]	 of	
Chalcedon,	 placing	 it	 now	 in	 the	 field	 of	 the	 action	 of	 the	 ‘united	 double	 desire’	 of	
theandric	 communication	 …	 Constantinopolitan	 Christology	 completes	 Coakley’s	





proper	 (Cyrilline)	 dyothelitism	 is	 enough	 to	 specify	 the	 “ontological	 mode	 of	 the	
circumincession	 of	 difference	 in	 Christ.”40	 Summarizing	 Maximus	 (Opusculum	 7),	 he	
articulates	 the	 communicatio	 in	 this	way:	 “In	 Jesus,	 the	 human	 by	 nature	works	 to	will	
divinely	 what	 God	 by	 nature	 works	 to	 will	 humanly.”41	 Interestingly,	 Riches	 notes	 a	
correspondence	in	Maximus	here	with	both	Cyril	of	Alexandria	and	the	“non‐Chalcedonian	
Syriac	Christology”	of	Pseudo‐Denys	 the	Areopagite,	 for	whom,	most	 importantly,	Christ	
evinces	 a	 “new	 theandric	 energy.”42	 This	 notion	 of	 “theandric”	 energy	 is	 all‐important.	
Significantly,	Riches	articulates	its	meaning	for	us	through	Maximus,	from	Ambiguum	48,	
who	enigmatically	states:		
God,	 having	 made	 all	 nature	 according	 to	 wisdom,	 secretly	 placed	 in	 each	 being	 of	
rational	nature	a	primary	dunamis	of	knowledge	of	him	…	 for	 in	giving	 to	us	humble	




















which	attempts	 to	express	even	 further	 the	radicality	of	 the	paradox	of	 the	union	of	 the	
two	 natures.	 According	 to	Maximus,	 God	 imparted	 Godself	 at	 the	 very	 center	 of	 human	
being	in	the	act	of	creation	in	order	for	human	beings	to	be	fundamentally	ordered	toward	
God	 as	 their	 natural	 end.	 God	 is	 therefore	 the	 very	 presupposition	 for	 the	meaning	 of	
human	nature:	 the	 total	measure	 of	 humanity	 is	 (by	 grace)	 divinity	 itself,	which	Riches	
concretely	expresses	as	“the	theandric	reciprocity	of	created	and	uncreated	Love.”44	There	
is	therefore	the	very	same	desire	that	defines	both	divine	and	human	natures—desiderium	
naturale	videndem	Deum—but	existing	according	 to	 two	different	modes,	 a	divine	and	a	
creaturely.	 In	Christ,	 then,	 the	 radical	 unity	 is	 completed	 and	made	 explicit	 through	 the	
communicatio	 idiomatum	 in	 Christ’s	 concrete	 acts	 of	 love	 for	 the	 Father:	 viz.,	 the	 total	
conformation	of	his	will	to	the	Father’s	in	his	obedience	all	the	way	from	manger	through	




its	 true	end,	 implanted	within	 it	 from	the	beginning.	The	“energy”	(dunamis)	of	Christ	 is	
both	divine	and	human,	truly	divine	and	truly	human—theandric—completely	divine	and	
therefore	 completely	human.	Hence,	 for	Riches,	 “[t]here	 is	no	 ‘pure’	 life	of	 Jesus	 that	can	
discretely	serve	the	normative	function	of	an	‘original	text’,	there	is	no	‘humanity’	of	Jesus	
that	 can	 be	 manifested	 apart	 from	 his	 divine	 Person,	 and	 there	 is	 no	 ‘pure	 nature’	 of	
humanity	 that	 can	 be	 revealed	 apart	 from	 the	 theandric	 Christ	 who	 ‘reveals	 man	 to	
himself’.”45		
	









Following	 Riches’	 construction,	 it	 would	 be	 possible	 to	 read	 in	 Coakley	 an	 unwitting	
accommodation	 with	 an	 all‐too‐neo‐Scholastic	 “parallelism,”	 which	 only	 serves	 to	 reify	
again	the	separation	of	nature	and	grace	into	two	discrete	spheres.	It	is	often	said	that	for	
Karl	 Rahner	 the	 old	 duplex	 ordo	 is	 dissolved	 but	 re‐inscribed	 by	 a	more	 self‐subsisting	
philosophical	 anthropology	 that	 only	 serves	 to	 naturalize	 grace	 in	 the	 end.	 If	 this	 is	 the	
case,	 it	 substantially	 informs	 his	 Christology.	 This	 is,	 of	 course,	 a	 bit	 of	 a	 caricature:	












critique,	 and	 therefore	 recognition	 of	 this	 no	 doubt	 blunts	 the	 edges	 of	 the	 harshest	
elements	 of	 the	 criticism,	 Rahner’s	 anthropological	 construction,	 apart	 from	 the	
terminology,	arrives	from	somewhere	else	than	concrete	revelation.	At	the	very	least	it	is	
articulated	by	a	philosophical	grammar	which	is	less	than	thoroughly	probed	and	purified	
by	 the	 light	 of	 the	 data	 of	 revelation.	 So,	 Rahner’s	 conception	 of	 “nature”,	 if	 it	 is	 surely	
(always,	already!)	uplifted,	perfected,	healed	by	grace,	it	is	nevertheless	less	clear	how	this	








brings	 into	 question	 the	 need	 for	 a	 supernatural	 end	 that	 orders	 the	 totality	 of	 the	
creature—and	 this	 despite	 her	 critical	 theological	 rearticulation	 designed	 to	 refigure	
feminist	 teleology	with	 this	 particular	 problem	 in	mind.	 In	 other	words,	 the	 problem	 is	
that	the	articulation	of	the	good	of	 liberation	is	harshly	(if	 implicitly)	distinguished	from	
the	 final	 eschatological	 good	 of	 the	 visio	beatifica.	 This	we	would	 have	 to	 trace	 back	 to	
what	we	can	call	at	least	by	comparison	to	Riches,	her	bifurcated	Christology.	To	elect	the	
former	 (liberation)	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 the	 latter	 (eschatology)	 is	 merely	 to	 reverse	 the	
binary	 of	 neo‐scholastic	 “two	 orders	 theology”	 and	 therefore	 to	 remain	 shackled	 to	 its	
logic.	In	terms	of	Christology	this	inevitably	tends	towards	a	stress	on	the	distinction	and	
self‐integrity	of	 the	human	nature	conceived	 in	some	way	apart	 from	 its	union	 from	the	






Rahner,	 despite	 rightly	 rejecting	 the	 received	 view	 that	 the	 gratuity	 of	 grace	 is	
properly	maintained	 via	 a	 nature	 understood	 as	 possessing	 no	 intrinsic	 need	 for	 grace,	
still	 allows	 a	 highly	 developed	 anthropocentric	 starting	 point	 to	 shape	 the	 theological	
dimension.	For	Coakley	though,	the	relation	is	again	more	complex:	the	problem	is	figured	
with	 feminist	 liberative	 ends	 in	mind,	 in	which	 the	 Cyrilline	 unification	 for	 the	 sake	 of	
theological	 coherence	 results	 in	 “strained	 credibility	 about	 the	 form	 of	 Christ’s	 earthly	
life.”47	 Such	 a	 reading	 of	 the	 Cyrilline	 emphasis	 on	 the	 priority	 of	 the	 divine,	 that	 is,	
understood	 to	 be	 asserted	 over	 against	 the	 human	 may	 “insidiously	 fuel	 masculinist	
















which	 the	Definition	 itself	 attempts	 to	 rule	 out.	 If	 read	 in	 this	way,	 her	 proposal	would	
seem	 to	 subsume	or	 at	 least	 imply,	 one	 the	 one	hand,	 a	 bizarre	Eutychianism,	 in	which	
Christ	 becomes	 a	 “third	 thing”,	 an	 amalgamation	 of	 divinity	 and	 humanity—only	 here,	
strangely,	in	terms	of	person	instead	of	nature,	and	thus,	on	the	other	hand,	a	human	fully	
integral	 in	 itself	prior	 to	 the	union,	all	 too	redolent	of	 the	 “prosopic”	union	of	Nestorius.	
Coakley’s	concern	seems	to	be	that	the	union	itself	not	be	imposed	from	beyond	by	divine	
“fiat”	 before	 the	 agency	 of	 Christ’s	 humanity.	 At	 this	 point	 one	 would	 wonder	 then,	
whether	Coakley	would	still	accept	the	orthodox	title	Theotokos	for	the	Virgin?	(Finally,	at	
this	point,	 the	horizon	of	a	Mariology	would	seem	to	become	essential	here	 for	 feminist	
concerns.)	Taken	at	face	value,	it	seems	her	Christology	would	delimit	the	incarnation	to	
Christ’s	 adult	 life—perhaps	 at	 the	 Baptism?	 But	 wouldn’t	 this	 be	 yet	 another	 insidious	
form	of	Adoptionism?	Otherwise,	for	her,	human	freedom	and	nature	is	put	in	jeopardy	by	
a	 divine	 power	 that	 overwhelms	 creaturely	 reality,	 rather	 than	 realizing	 its	 inherent	
possibilities.	Coakley	does	not	say	whether	she	accepts	Maximus	the	Confessor’s	view	that	
human	 nature	 as	 such	 performs	 a	 certain	 (active)	 receptivity	 to	 the	 divine.	 This	would	
alleviate	many	of	these	difficulties	that	I	draw	out	here,	though,	again,	it	would	demand	an	
Alexandrian	 rather	 than	Antiochene	 emphasis,	 since,	 for	Maximus,	 the	 humanity	 is	 only	
really	 human	 in	 self‐abandoning	 surrender	 to	 the	 divine,	 a	 kenōsis	 rooted	 in	 the	
Trinitarian	life,	as	Christ	showed	by	his	agony	in	the	garden.49		
	
If	 what	 we	 outline	 here	 has	 any	 merit,	 then	 Coakley	 disengages	 the	 spiritual	
meaning	of	kenōsis	from	its	concrete	foundations	in	its	originating	Christological	meaning.	
For	her,	 the	 kenotic	hymn	of	Philippians	2	 is	 therefore	primarily	 “an	 invitation	 to	 enter	
into	 Christ’s	 extended	 life	 in	 the	 church,	 not	 just	 to	 speculate	 dispassionately	 on	 his	
nature.”50	 Clearly,	 this	 particular	 disengagement	 is	 undertaken	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 a	 re‐
engagement	of	Christology	and	spiritual	praxis—but	a	Christology	cleansed	of	its	alleged	
tendency	 to	elide	 the	 integrity	and	 freedom	of	 the	human	dimension	 for	 the	sake	of	 the	
hypostatic	 union,	 that	 corresponds,	 she	 insinuates,	 with	 a	 harmful	 spirituality	 of	 self‐
abnegation,	 deferral	 and	 self‐diminishment.	 This	 view	 corresponds	 with	 what	 we	 have	
already	seen	regarding	her	important	insight	into	the	Chalcedonian	formula	as	a	summary	
of	 the	 salvific	 acta,	 rather	 than	 an	 abstract	 metaphysical	 schema.	 In	 so	 doing,	 she	 still	
succeeds	in	making	the	cross	and	resurrection	central	to	her	religious	refigurement	of	the	
liberation	 ideal.	Coakley	offers	much	 to	ponder:	 the	reintegration	of	spiritual	experience	
(prayer)	and	praxis	(feminist	liberation)	with	constructive	dogmatic	reflection	is	clearly	a	
recovery	of	important	modes	of	theology	very	much	lost	in	the	modern	period.	The	close	












concerns.	 Finally,	 her	 catholic	 hermeneutic	 of	 integration	 and	patristic	 ressourcement	 of	




In	 terms	 of	 her	 Christological	 vision,	 it	 is	 worth	 questioning	 whether	 Coakley	
resonates	 too	 much	 with	 a	 difficult	 element	 of	 Rahner’s	 “supernatural	 existential”,	
specifically	its	de	facto	“banalization”	of	religious	experience	and	religious	praxis	(making	
mundane	 human	 experience	 “spiritual”).	 That	 is,	 there	 is	 a	 question	whether	 Coakley’s	
specific	spiritual	re‐engagement	of	kenōsis	in	Christology	would	tend	to	reduce	“authentic	






more	 thoroughly	 developed	 Christological	 reflection	 from	 this	 important	 contemporary	
theologian,	which	will	only	come	as	the	trajectory	inscribed	in	her	project	bears	itself	out.	
Only	 from	 the	 vantage	 of	 the	 total	 telos	 of	 her	 project	 can	 the	 question	 of	 which	 is	





defines	 it.	 Pointing	 out	 (as	 I	 did	 above)	 her	 facile	 opposition	 between	 Antiochene	
(emphasizing	 the	 humanity)	 and	 Alexandrian	 (supposedly	 denigrating	 it)	 Christologies,	
can	open	up	for	us	the	further	conclusion,	after	Riches,	that	the	concrete	union	operated	
by	 Christ’s	 hypostatic	 incarnation	 cannot	 be	 approached	 from	 the	 starting	 point	 of	 a	
conviction	or	thesis	about	the	general	relation	of	the	divine	and	human	natures	(as	in,	say,	
a	metaphysics	 of	 creation).	 Any	 general	 conviction	 about	 human	 nature,	 even	 one	with	
feminist	 concerns,	 must	 be	 rethought	 through	 Christology,	 not	 the	 other	 way	 around.	
Otherwise,	 our	 understanding	 of	 humanity	 will	 be	 extrinsic	 to	 Christ,	 and	 our	
understanding	 of	 Christ	 will	 be	 in	 danger	 of	 being	 itself	 “extrinsicist.”51	 What	 this	
observation	 seems	 to	 suggest	 is	 that	 Coakley’s	 narrative	 of	 modern	 Christological	
problematic	 (shared	 with	 Rahner),	 in	 which	 an	 over‐Cyrilline	 stress	 dominates	 and	
threatens	to	overcome,	breach,	circumvent,	or	“obliterate”	(to	use	her	word)	the	integrity	
of	the	creaturely	nature,	can	only	avoid	a	disastrous	elision	into	a	Eutychean	confusion	of	

















between	 the	 divine	 and	 human,	 primarily	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 the	 integrity	 and	 goodness	 of	











We	 can	 wholeheartedly	 agree	 with	 Coakley	 that	 the	 enigma	 of	 Chalcedon	 is	 itself	 an	
invitation	 to	 constructive,	 albeit	 dogmatic,	 theology.	 In	 fact	 one	 should	 say	 that	 the	




most	 important	 reason	 that	 the	 implication,	 discovered	 in	 its	 light,	 that	 Coakley’s	
“confected”	 Christology	 is	 still,	 at	 present,	 too	 redolent	 of	 a	 “pure	 nature”	 (probably	
resulting	 from	 a	 strong	 but	 latent	 influence	 of	 Rahner	 on	 her	 thought,	 along	 with	 the	
particular	 difficulties	 still	 being	 worked	 out	 within	 feminist	 discourse)	 which,	 after	 de	
Lubac,	only	 tends	 to	 lose	any	 stable	 conception	of	 that	which	 it	 seeks	most	 to	preserve,	







Finally,	 one	must	 say,	 therefore,	 that	 the	 enigma	 of	 Chalcedon	 is	 best	 approached	
when	 understood	 in	 developmental	 continuity	 with	 Constantinople	 III,	 and	 therefore	
consider	 dyothelitism,	 paradoxically,	 as	 an	 important	 development	 of	 an	 Alexandrian	
Chalcedon.	 Yet	 I	 must	 ask:	 Is	 the	 enigma	 of	 Chalcedon	 hereby	 “solved”?	 One	 must	
vigorously	agree	with	Coakley’s	profound	 insight	 that	Chalcedon,	 even	 read	 through	 the	
lens	 of	 later	 dogmatic	 development,	 is	 only	 still	an	 invitation	 to	 reflection:	 the	 essential	
issues	raised	are	in	no	way	resolved.	Rather,	it	is	only	here	that	the	essential	questions	of	
Christology	can	first	properly	be	asked.	What	matters	is	the	articulation	of	the	salvation	of	
humanity	 by	 means	 of	 the	 hypostatic	 union	 that	 precisely	 as	 union	 expresses	 the	
difference	of	humanity	from	divinity,	and	thereby,	again,	precisely	as	union,	manifests	the	















will	 be	 the	 case,	 but	 it	will	 be	properly	 approached	only	 insofar	 as	 a	 feminist	 project	 is	
recognized	 to	 be	 necessarily	 part	 of	 a	 broader	 humanist	 one	 understood	 within	 a	
Christological	 vision	 that	 is	 soteriological	 through	and	 through.	To	 raise	 the	question	of	































Copyright of Australian e-Journal of Theology is the property of Australian Catholic
University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a
listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print,
download, or email articles for individual use.
